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ALIGNING PHYSICIAN DECISION-MAKING WITH
THE GOALS OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS:
ARE THERE ANY LESSONS FROM LAW FIRMS?
Edward Correia*
ABSTRACT In order to achieve efficiency in the delivery of health care
services, it is essential to align more closely the behavior of physicians with
the goals of the health care organization with which they are affiliated
Achieving alignment presents a number of challenges, including legal
constraints, a long tradition of physician independence, a tendency for
physicians to become involved in procurement decisions, and a scarcity of
comparative effectiveness data that could serve as a basis for treatment
protocols and purchasing decisions. The article discusses these challenges
and suggests some partial solutions. In addition, it compares the incentives
that affect physicians in health care organizations and partners in law firms
and suggests that there may be some lessons that health care organizations
can learn from the firms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The American health care system is, to put it mildly, complex. The recent
health care reform bill, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("ACA"),' took over 2000 pages to make adjustments to the system that did
not alter its fundamental structure of the American health care system. Even
though the Supreme Court has agreed to review a challenge to the ACA,2 we
assume that much of the statute will remain in place for the long term.' The
* Adjunct Professor, American University Washington College of Law. The author
wishes to thank the following individuals for helpful comments: JoAnn Lamphere, Tom
Hughes, Dr. William Marsh, and Carolyn Osolinik. The author also thanks Priya Lamba,
a third year student at the Washington College of Law, for valuable research assistance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended at scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and 42
U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA].
2. See Florida v. Dep't Health & Human Servs., 648 F. 3d 1235, cert. granted, 80
U.S.L.W. 648 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011); Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393;
Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398; Florida v. Dep't Health & Human
Servs., No. 11-400.
3. This assumption is supported by the bulk of the U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions
addressing the ACA's constitutionality. Five Circuits have addressed the
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most controversial question is whether Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to require individuals to purchase health insurance.4
There is still an incredibly diverse and fragmented system of providers,
ranging from physicians who practice alone to very large Integrated
Delivery Networks ("IDNs"), which manage dozens of hospitals and
contract with or employ thousands of physicians and other health ca're
providers and staff. Although health care reform imposed significant
constitutionality of the ACA. The Eleventh Circuit declared 26 U.S.C. §5000A
unconstitutional, but also found it severable from the rest of the bill (meaning the vast
majority of the provisions relevant to this discussion would remain intact). Florida, 648
F. 3d at 1235. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits both upheld the bill in its entirety. Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F. 3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (2-1 with dissenting judge
dissenting from merits); Seven-sky v. Holder, 661 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (2-1 with
dissenting judge arguing for no jurisdiction). The Third and Fourth Circuits declined to
reach the merits, dismissing the challenges for jurisdictional reasons. New Jersey
Physician, Inc. v. President of the United States, 653 F. 3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (lack of
standing); Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Cucinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th
Cir. 2011) (lack of standing); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F. 3d 391 (4th Cir.
2011), (lack of subject matter jurisdiction). In one of two cases, the Fourth Circuit
concurrence and dissent each argued that if the court had jurisdiction, those judges would
have upheld the ACA in its entirety, though for differing reasons. Liberty Univ., 671 F.
3d at 415, 422 (concurrence based on Tax and Spend power, dissent based on Commerce
power).
4. The Supreme Court heard arguments on March 27, 2012, regarding the
individual mandate and heard arguments on March 28, 2012, regarding severability. It
was widely reported that many Justices expressed skepticism about whether the
Commerce Clause can be interpreted broadly enough so support the mandate. See, e.g.,
Robert Barnes & N. C. Aizenman, Supreme Court Expresses Doubts on Key
Constitutional Issue in Health-care Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2012, at Al.
5. See Healthcare, GLG Industry Dictionary, Integrated Delivery Network (IDN),
GLG RESEARCH, http://www.glgresearch.com/Dictionary/HC-Integrated-Delivery-
Network-(IDN).html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (stating "IDNs include many types of
associations across the continuum of care and one network may include a short- and long-
term hospital, HMO, PHO, PPO, Home Health agency, and hospice services, for
example. Multi-hospital systems and mergers may be considered limited IDNs in that
different entities join forces to provide care."); see also About Us, Centers, All Fee-For-
Service Providers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/
center/provider.asp (last modified Dec. 9, 2011) (listing different types of providers);
Statistics and Studies, Fast Facts on US Hospitals, AM. HosP. Ass'N,
http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml (relaying that 1,508
community hospitals are in a network, while 2,941 community hospitals are in a system).
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restrictions on the private health insurance industry, the reform did not
create a single payer system, as is the case with some European systems, or
even a "public option" for insurance coverage that is available to everyone.6
Most Americans will still have private insurance coverage7 and private
insurers will still determine reimbursement levels for most providers, subject
to state and federal regulation. For historical and political reasons, the
American health care system is destined to remain in its complex state for
the foreseeable future.
This article addresses one important element in promoting the efficiency
of the health care system: aligning the incentives of physicians and the
health care organization ("HCO") with which they are associated.9 This is
only one aspect of increasing the efficiency of health care delivery, but it is a
central one because physician decision-making drives the allocation of
resources for virtually all types of medical treatment. Physicians have an
extraordinary degree of discretion in clinical decision-making, regardless of
the form of HCO with which they are associated. To some extent,
physicians are comparable to attorneys in law firms. Both groups are
highly-skilled professionals with years of professional training. Both often
work with or in large organizations and might have financial incentives that
may conflict with the goals of these organizations. Consequently, it may be
useful to compare these groups of professionals and how their organizations
deal with the problem of alignment.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the general idea of
integration and how the benefits of integration can be undermined if the
HCO fails to achieve a reasonable level of physician alignment. Part III
6. See Miles Mogulescu, Obama, Durbin and Pelosi All Point Fingers at Someone
Else for Killing Public Option, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miles-mogulescu/obama-durbin-and-pelosi-
a b 497359.html.
7. Compare CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PUBLICATION AND
INFORMATION PRODUCTS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2010, HEALTH INSURANCE 8,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus/healthinsurance.htm with THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., Focus ON HEALTH REFORM, SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW
(2012), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf
8. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 7.
9. I use the term health care organization ("HCO") as a generic description of any
organization of health care providers, ranging from very large, integrated delivery
networks ("IDNs"), to independent hospitals that provide admitting privileges to
physicians.
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provides some examples of the problems that may arise if physician
decisions are inconsistent with the goals of an HCO. Part IV compares the
incentives to lawyers and physicians and discusses whether there are any
lessons to draw. Part V describes different categories of decisions made by
lawyers and physicians, which suggest some strategies for alignment. Part
VI suggests some partial solutions to the problem of physician alignment.
II. INTEGRATION OF PROVIDERS WITHIN AN HCO
A consistent theme in moving toward a more efficient health care system
is integration, i.e., coordinating, by common ownership or contract, the
activities of different providers in a way that minimizes costs and improves
outcomes.' 0 How can integration lead to lower costs and better medical
outcomes? For a simple example, assume health care services are divided
into five categories: (1) non-physician preventive care;" (2) primary
physician out-patient care;12 (3) specialty physician outpatient care; (4)
acute inpatient care;14 and (5) post-hospitalization follow-up care. Note
10. See Accountable Care Organizations: Improving Care Coordination for People
with Medicare, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/
factsheets/2011/03/accountablecareO3312011 a.html [hereinafter HEALTHCARE.GOV:
ACO] (explaining that the Accountable Care Act (ACA) reforms create incentives for
coordination that will improve the patients' and community health, increase the quality of
health care provided, and lower costs). See also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO 11-49, HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: FEATURES OF INTEGRATED SYSTEMS SUPPORT
PATIENT CARE STRATEGIES AND ACCESS TO CARE, BUT SYSTEM FACES CHALLENGES I
(2010) (discussing how fragmentation in health care can lead to lower quality of care,
inefficiencies, and higher costs, and that one way providers are dealing with the problems
of fragmentation is by forming integrated delivery systems).
11. See Preventive Medicine: A Student Resource, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH.
PUB. HEALTH, http://www.jhsph.edu/PrevMedstudentresource (last visited Jan. 6,
2012) (defining preventive medicine).
12. See John Hopkins Primary Care Policy Center, Definitions, JOHNS HOPKINS
BLOOMBERG SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://www.jhsph.edu/pcpc/definitions.html (last visited
Jan. 6, 2012) (defining primary care).
13. See Tertiary Care Definition, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/patient-care/paybill/insurance-footnotes.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2012) (defining specialty care).
14. Acute inpatient care is "a pattern of health care in which a patient is treated for a
brief but severe episode of illness, for the sequelae of an accident or other trauma, or
during recovery from surgery. Acute care is usually given in a hospital [i.e. inpatient] by
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that the first four levels move from the least technologically complex to the
most complex, while level (5) represents a return to less technical
complexity. A small expenditure for services in a less technically complex
category, e.g., flu vaccinations or glucose monitoring in level (1), or early
detection of disease in level (2), can prevent much greater expenditures in a
higher category.16 The same is true for services in level (5), which may
reduce the number of expensive hospital readmissions.17 The challenge is
specialized personnel using complex and sophisticated technical equipment and
materials, and it may involve intensive or emergency care. This pattern of care is often
necessary for only a short time, unlike chronic care." MosBY'S MED. DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2009). By contrast, outpatient care is given outside a medical facility (i.e., at a
person's home). See id.
15. See, About the H2H National Quality Improvement Initiative, H2H: HOSPITAL TO
HOME, http://h2hquality.org/WhatisH2H/AboutH2H/tabid/168/Default.aspx (last visited
Jan. 6, 2012) (focusing on medication management post-discharge, early follow-up, and
symptom management in order to reduce cardiovascular-related hospital readmissions).
See also Alicare Medical Management Expands Patient Transition Coaching Program to
Reduce Readmissions, PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE (June 29, 2010)
http://www.psqh.com/product-news/560-alicare-medical-management-expands-patient-
transition-coaching-program-to-reduce-readmissions.html (reporting that one of the
nation's leading care management solution providers is having health coaches ensure that
patients are informed about post-discharge follow-up care and self-management services
in order to reduce readmissions).
16. See Lorian E. Hardcastle et al., Improving the Population's Health: The
Affordable Care Act and the Importance of Integration, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 317,
317-327 (2011) (arguing that billions are unnecessarily spent on conditions that might
have been prevented or lessened in severity, or the costs for which could have been
decreased, if there was earlier, preventive care); see id at 318 (explaining that evidence
indicates that preventive interventions account for 80% of the reduction in morbidity and
mortality). See also MOLLY FRENCH, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N, SHIFTING THE COURSE OF
OUR NATION'S HEALTH: PREVENTION AND WELLNESS AS A POLICY (2009),
http://www.apha.org/NR/rdonlyres/0867A2FF-88EE-41CF-97C3-
21E79D8C8896/0/FINALPreventionPolicy.pdf (arguing that the key to sustainable cost
containment in health care is implementing reforms in clinical preventive services); U.S.
PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HIGH-
PRIORITY EVIDENCE GAPS FOR CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES (2011),
http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/annlrpt/tfannrpt2011 .pdf.
17. See Margaret A. Kuehl, Hospital to Home National Quality Initiative, STAT
BULLETIN (April-May 2010). See also Stephen F. Jencks et al., Rehospitalizations
Among Patients in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1418,
1428 (2009) (finding that the costs to Medicare of unplanned rehospitalizations in 2004
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how to allocate resources in a way that achieves the right "service mix" for
patients.
In theory, integration through common ownership or contract is not
essential to achieving the right mix. The key to achieving efficiency is
coordination, not any particular business arrangement.18  A local health
department, for example, could take responsibility for promoting
vaccinations, ensuring that diabetics monitor blood glucose levels, and
providing post-hospitalization follow-up, while an IDN serving the same
community provides outpatient primary and specialty care and inpatient
care.19  But the budgetary and service decisions of the local health
department are made separately from the HCO and they may have very
different priorities from each other.20 There is no structural incentive for the
health department to spend $100,000 on these services even though doing so
might prevent $10 million in HCO expenditures for inpatient care.21 Even in
was $17.4 billion); C. Clancy, Re-Engineered Hospital Discharge Process Lowers Re-
Admissions, Reduces Costs, 6 PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE 8, 9 (2009);
Peter Orszag, New Study on Hospital Readmissions, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Apr.
8, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/09/04/08/NewStudyonHospital
Readmissions/.
18. A similar consideration arises in the antitrust context when the antitrust agencies
consider whether competitors are genuinely "integrated" in order to determine whether a
"rule of reason" or "per se" rule applies. See HEALTHCARE.GOV: ACO, supra note 10
(emphasizing the need for coordination under the ACA). See also DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTH CARE 11
(2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/reports/nationalqualitystrategy
032011 .pdf [hereinafter DHHS NATIONAL STRATEGY] (reporting that models show that
coordination between providers, from small physician practice settings to larger hospital
center settings, can decrease costs and increase quality).
19. See, e.g., Michael McRobbie, The Academy's Pivotal Role in Supporting Public-
Private Partnerships to Prevent Chronic Diseases, 6 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 1-
4 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2009/apr/08_0218.htm (concluding
from an Indiana University study that private-public cooperative partnerships acieve
balanced division of labor and resources, and can be characterized as collaborations
continuums).
20. Id.
21. PHILIP D. SLOANE ET AL., AM. MED. Ass'N, EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PARTNERSHIPS
BETWEEN PRIMARY CARE MEDICAL PRACTICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES 10 (2011),
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/433/clinical-partnerships.pdf (listing
factors upon which successful coordination depends).
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the unlikely event that the health department and the HCO agree on the right
service mix, the difficulties in information-sharinp and joint decision-
making render consistent coordination problematic. Thus, integration of
these services within a single HCO is a potentially superior way to create the
economic incentives and organizational arrangements necessary for the most
efficient use of resources.
Understanding the benefits of integration is one thing, while implementing
them is another. Most health care providers in the U.S. operate relatively
independently, for example, solo physicians, physicians in small group
practices, or independent hospitals. Some IDNs do not offer all the levels
of care described above, and even very large IDNs cannot fully integrate all
these levels of service.2 4 In the examples above, patients must cooperate in
receiving vaccinations and monitoring their own glucose levels. The most
that an IDN can do is provide information and outreach, for example,
through phone calls or home health visits.25 Patients may use health care
2 2. Id.
23. See, e.g., HSCdataOnline, CTRS. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE,
http://hscdataonline.s-3.com/psurveyr5.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) (relaying that
about 32% of physicians are in solo or two physicians practice, 14.5% are part of group
practice of three to five physicians, 19.4% are part of a group practice of six to fifty
physicians, 6.1% are part of a group practice of more than fifty physicians, 3.5% are part
of an HMO, and 13.1% practice in hospitals).
24. See James F. Blumstein, Of Doctors and Hospitals: Setting the Analytical
Framework for Managing and Regulating the Relationship, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 211,
218, 231 (2007) (noting that IDNs come in "many sizes, shapes, and structures," and
further noting that, generally, IDNs have not yet achieved the level of integration needed
to lead to cost efficiencies and higher quality care). See also Hospital-Physician
Relationships & Accountable Care Organizations, 50 Integrated Delivery Systems to
Know, BECKER'S HosP. REV., (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-physician-relationships/50-integrated-
delivery-systems-to-know.html (listing and providing detailed information on some of the
nation's integrated health systems).
25. Because of the importance of patient behavior outside the hospital, some IDNs
have begun to offer community outreach to prevent a serious illness episode and
readmissions after hospitalization. See, e.g., Health Info and Classes, INOVA HEALTH
Sys., http://www.inova.org/health-info-and-classes/index.jsp (last visited July 16, 2011)
(providing information on community classes, educational programs, events, screenings,
and lectures offered in Northern Virginia by Inova Health System). See also SHARP, SAN
DIEGO'S HEALTH CARE LEADER, SHARP HEALTHCARE COMMUNITY BENEFITS PLAN AND
REPORT FY 2011 46 (2011), http://www.sharp.com/about/community/upload/SHC_
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providers outside the IDN that provide poor Juality care, ultimately driving
up the costs of care provided by the HCO. For example, a patient may
have to be readmitted to an HCO's hospital because of poor quality post-
operative care by another provider.27 The high value placed on ensuring that
a patient can choose his or her own doctor has now become widely accepted
by legislators and policy-makers even though there may be significant
inefficiencies. Despite these limitations, integration offers a significant
potential to reduce health care costs. 29
CommunityBenefitsPlanFY2010.pdf (reporting that Sharp spent $3,125,051 in Fiscal
Year 2010 on community benefits, including health education and information, support
groups, health fairs, etc.).
26. Cf PPOs v. HMOs, Health, Insurance, Health Care Plans,
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (Oct. 2011), http://www.consumerreports.org/health/insurance/
health-insurance/how-to-pick-health-insurance/hmo-vs-ppo.htm (referencing the
distinction between Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) as PPOs providing easier access to out-of-network providers but
resulting in higher costs, while HMOs make access to out-of-network providers more
difficult but usually cost less).
27. This is a weakness in the new Accountable Care Organization (ACO) program.
The proposed ACO Rule provided that patients who are beneficiaries of a particular ACO
cannot be required to use the services of the ACO. See Medicare Shared Savings
Program: Accountable Care Organizations (Proposed Rule), 76 Fed. Reg. 19,528, 19,645,
§ 425.6(a)(2) (proposed Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R pt. 425) ("Beneficiary
assignment to an ACO is for purposes of determining . .. whether an ACO has achieved
savings ... and in no way diminishes or restricts the right of beneficiaries assigned to an
ACO to exercise free choice in determining where to receive health care services.").
CMS made some adjustments to the beneficiary assignment formulas in the final rule but
it retained the principle that an ACO's beneficiaries have the freedom to obtain care from
any provider they choose. See Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program:
Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,851-70 (Nov. 11, 2011).
28. See Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,804 ("We have also been vigilant in protecting the
rights and benefits of FFS beneficiaries under traditional Medicare to maintain the same
access to care and freedom of choice that existed prior to the implementation of this
program.").
29. See PPOs v. HMOs, supra note 26.
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III. THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICIAN ALIGNMENT
The challenge of achieving effective integration raises the problem of
physician alignment, i.e., ensuring that the decision-making of physicians is
consistent with the goals of the HCO. 30 The problem of physician alignment
has been recognized for decades, and considerable research has been done to
understand the barriers to alignment.3 1 It may seem strange, given the high
stakes involved, that physicians still make decisions so independently. On
the other hand, physicians are not unique in functioning relatively
independently as professionals in large organizations. Law firms face
analogous problems. Below, I discuss when these problems are similar and
when they are different. First, consider two examples of the problem of
alignment in the health care context.
A. Example One: Ordering Catheters
For many inpatients, decisions must be made about when to use urinary
catheters. 32  Inserting catheters are medically necessary under some
30. See William H. Thompson, Aligning Hospital and Physician Incentives in the
Era of Pay-for-Performance, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 327, 334 (2006) (summarizing that
one of the goals of physician alignment is "to align clinical, operational, and financial
incentives among the physicians, the hospitals, and other caregivers."). See also Steven
H. Pratt, Hospital-Physician Joint Venture Relationships: A Useful Tool to Improve
Hospital Services, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 241, 243 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Jonathon D. Ketcham & Michael F. Furukawa, Hospital-Physician
Gainsharing in Cardiology, 27 HEALTH AFF. 803, 803 (2008) ("A common obstacle to
improving hospital quality and controlling costs is the misalignment of hospitals and their
medical staffs."). See also R.A. Barenson et al., Hospital-Physicians Relations:
Cooperation, Competition, or Separation?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 31, 31 (2007); Lawton R.
Burns & Ralph W. Muller, Hospital-Physician Collaboration: Landscape of Economic
Integration and Impact on Clinical Integration, 86 MILBANK Q. 393, 393 (2008) ("even
though physicians may support the hospital's goals, they may neither share these goals
nor feel responsible for achieving them at the expense of their own future income or
professional satisfaction."); Anne Sharamitaro, Co-Management Arrangements-
Aligning Physicians and Hospitals, HEALTH CAP. Topics (Health Capital Consultants, St.
Louis, Mo.) (July 2010), http://www.healthcapital.com/hcc/newsletter/
07 10/Comanage.pdf (noting that physician alignment has been "an ongoing struggle,
particularly since the shift from small . . . independent private practices to captive
practices within larger integrated health systems.").
32. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION OF CATHETER-ASSOCIATED URINARY TRACT
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circumstances, but there are also cost and safety implications.33 For
example, there are costs not only associated with the catheters themselves
and staff time to insert them, but also for the inevitable high number of
infections that follow.34 On the other hand, the use of catheters saves the
time of nursing staff and, when used appropriately, can lead to better
medical outcomes.35 Hospital administrators may have one view about the
use of catheters, while the physicians, who must actually order them, may
have another. Even if the physicians are employees of the hospital and, in
theory, report directly to the Administrator or a Medical Director, they may
still make decisions that are inconsistent with the overall goals of the HCO.
B. Example Two: Purchases for the OR
A substantial portion of the costs of the health care system is made up of
purchases of drugs, devices, and supplies. 36  Consequently, purchasing
decisions by HCOs are very significant in determining their overall costs.
INFECTIONS 23 (2009) [hereinafter CDC GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION] (stating that
between 15% and 25% of hospitalized patients may receive short term urinary catheters).
33. Id. See also RUTH M. KLEINPELL ET AL., PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN
EVIDENCE-BASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSES, Ch. 42 (2008),
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nurseshdbk/docs/KleinpellRTHCAI.pdf [hereinafter
HANDBOOK FOR NURSES] (specifying that UTIs account for 40% of hospital-associated
infections, and that approximately 80% of those are associated with urinary catheters).
34. One study found that urinary tract infections made up the highest number of
infections in the hospital. CDC GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION, supra note 32, at 23. See
also HANDBOOK FOR NURSES, supra note 33.
35. HANDBOOK FOR NURSES, supra note 33.
36. In 2009, the national health care supply chain itself represented $328 billion of
total national health care system costs. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
NHE WEB TABLES Thl. 2 (2011) (providing details on national health care expenditures
from 1960 to 2009). See also Press Release, Dep't of Def., DOD Reports Findings from
Initial Healthcare Product Data Synchronization Pilot (Nov. 15, 2007) (on file with
author).
37. Hospitals are spending approximately $140 billion on supplies, which is
approximately 20 percent of their operating costs and second only to labor costs. LISA
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For example, hospitals which offer brain tumor surgery must make decisions
regarding the type of surgical devices that are available to be used by
surgeons to isolate and remove brain tumor tissue. There are several
devices available on the market to perform this function, and the costs for
each device are substantial. 39 These are capital cost items, i.e., they can be
used many times by many physicians. 40 The HCO absorbs the costs of
purchasing these devices and bills patients and insurers for their use.
However, physicians typically decide which devices they want to use, and
HCOs have historically deferred to their wishes.41 As a result, HCOs may
purchase too many different devices or devices that are more expensive than
alternatives that perform just as well.42
IV. PROFESSIONALS IN ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS: COMPARING LAWYERS
AND PHYSICIANS
There are many similarities between senior physicians who are affiliated
with an HCO and senior lawyers who are affiliated with a law firm. Both
groups are highly educated and have spent many years developing skills in
38. For examples of the types of devices that are needed in these types of procedures,
see generally AM. BRAIN TUMOR Ass'N, SURGERY (2004), http://www.abta.org/
sitefiles/sitepages/abc3a809dea9e6f5bla2e4c935ed6188.pdf.
39. For an example of new, non-invasive technology that targets brain cancer cells
for removal, see Press Release, Food and Drug Admin., FDA Approves New Medical
Device for Form of Brain Cancer (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm251669.htm.
40. See Capital, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
capital%5B3%5D?show=0&t=1325921568 (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
41. Bill Asyltene et al., Accountable Care Organizations-Physician/Hospital
Integration, 21 THE HEALTH LAWYER 3 (2009) (". . . absent physician/hospital
integration, hospitals have no control over the decisions physicians make that drive
hospital costs.").
42. See id. at 4 (stating that doctors are responsible for 80% of hospitalization costs,
according to some studies, and that costs cannot be lowered without some control over
physician decisions). See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., EVALUATION
OF THE MEDICARE GAINSHARING DEMONSTRATION: INTERIM REPORT FOR QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT AND SAVINGS REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2011) [hereinafter CMS
GAINSHARING] (noting that physicians who control use of supplies and selection of
devices have "limited incentives" to efficiently use facilities and supplies or bargain for
lower-cost devices because the costs are incurred by hospitals).
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their profession.43 Both groups are highly compensated compared to the rest
of the workforce." Both groups have enough experience and specialized
skills that they likely expect to have a great deal of discretion in how they
handle particular cases. Both can be sued for negligence if they fail to act
reasonably based on the standards of their profession.45 Both groups can act
inconsistently with the goals of their organization and create difficult
management challenges in achieving alignment.
There are also significant differences between the two groups. The most
obvious difference between senior lawyers and physicians is that senior
46lawyers are partners in their firms, that is, they are owners. They have a
direct financial stake in the profitability of the firm.47 Although physicians
often have an equity interest in an affiliated group practice, they usually
48have no ownership interest in the HCO. Consequently, physician
compensation is not affected, at least in the short run, by the financial
success of the HCO. 4 9  The HCO purchases supplies, including very
43. See Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2012-2013 Edition, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocol002.htm.
44. As of May 2011, the average annual wage for physicians and surgeons was
$184,650, and the mean annual wage for lawyers was $130,490. See Occupational
Employment Statistics, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/
oesstru.htm#23-0000 (last modified Mar. 27, 2012).
45. See Professional Liability, 50 State Survey of Legal Malpractice Law, AM. BAR
Ass'N, http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/malpractice
survey.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). See also FED'N OF STATE MED. BDs., 2008
LEGISLATIVE SERVICE UPDATE (2008), http://www.fsmb.org/annualmeetingsessions/
thursday/regionalboardforums/legislativeupdate crockett c and d/crockett c and_
d.pdf.
46. The American Bar Association has conducted a survey of how law firms are




48. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6001, 124 Stat. 119, 684-89 (2010) (codified
as amended at scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and 42 U.S.C.). See also
42 C.F.R. pts. 411.354-56, 362-59 (2012).
49. C]. ACA § 6001; 42 C.F.R. pts. 411.354-56, 362-59.
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expensive equipment, at the request of the physicians, but the physicians do
not share in the costs of these supplies and equipment.50 Instead, the HCO
bills the patients (or their insurers) to cover the costs that are imposed on
them by physician decision-making.5 Physicians might worry that the HCO
could lose so much money that it must close its doors or that its facilities and
reputation will decline. While such developments could indirectly reduce
the physician's compensation or intangible benefits associated with the
physician's practice, these effects are usually too far down the road or too
tenuous to affect short-term physician decision-making behavior
significantly.
The incentives for salaried lawyers and salaried physicians are more
similar. Junior lawyers (called associates) are salaried employees of the
firm.52 Their bonuses are typically affected by the overall success of the
firm in a particular year, but this link between individual compensation and
financial success of the firm is probably too insignificant to influence their
decision-making behavior. 53 Associates work long hours because they want
to become partners some day and they want to get large bonuses, not
because they are trying to increase the profitability of the firm.54 Moreover,
associates are usually supervised by more senior attorneys.55 In general, if
50. See CMS GAINSHARING, supra note 42, at 2 (noting that physicians may,
knowingly or unknowingly, increase hospital costs through unnecessary use of supplies,
use of expensive devices, inefficient use of hospital resources, etc.).
51. See id.
52. See America's Largest 250 Law Firms, ILRG.COM, http://www.ilrg.com/nlj250
(last updated Jan. 2011) (providing data on number of associates and partners in the top
250 law firms).
53. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1913 (2008) (observing that
the financial interests of associates, partners, and firm management are not necessarily
aligned).
54. See id. ("Associates have an interest in receiving the training and work
assignments necessary to ensure that their skill set keeps pace with heir hourly rate,
which, in turn, fuels demand for their services. . . .").
55. See generally LAURA EMPsoN, MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW
CHALLENGES, NEW PERSPECTIVES (2007).
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senior attorneys are acting consistently with the interests of the firm, the
junior attorneys under their supervision are too.56
Like law firm associates, physicians on staff are salaried employees.
They may be eligible for bonuses or salary increases based on the financial
58performance of the HCO. Thus, they could be adversely affected if the
HCO loses money. However, even though the overall financial success of
the HCO has an indirect effect on their compensation, this effect is also too
tenuous to influence decision-making behavior significantly. 59 Their salaries
and bonuses are tied to their own performance, not to the performance of the
60HCO. Moreover, there is not as much of an established tradition of
supervision of junior physicians by senior physicians.6 1  Senior staff
physicians are expected to supervise junior staff physicians (e.g., first year
residents) but even supervision of residents may be limited. Moreover,
56. Id.
57. John Carroll, How Doctors Are Paid Now, And Why It Has to Change,
MANAGED CARE (Dec. 2007), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/
0712/0712.docpay.html.
58. Federal law places restrictions on how HCOs can compensate physicians in order
to avoid reducing services to patients, distorting clinical decision-making, and causing
other adverse effects. I discuss some of these laws below. See infra Part IV.C-E.
59. See, e.g., Top 10 Lessons Learned from "Mature" Co-Management
Arrangements, CAMDEN GROUP, http://www.thecamdengroup.com/blog/2011/10/top-10-
lessons-learned-from-mature-co-management-arrangements/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012)
("Many physicians confused co-management with gain-sharing and were surprised to
learn that the hospital savings are not shared with physicians.... Inadequate attention to
(and dollars in) the 'incentive' payment portion of the fees deflated physician
enthusiasm.").
60. Id.
61. Merit Buckley, Imposing Liability in the United States Medical Residency
Program: Exhaustion, Errors, and Economic Dependence, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 305, 310 (2009).
62. See id ("Residents are left without adequate supervision under the theory that the
stress of life and death decision-making is a significant part of the lesson in becoming a
doctor."). See also Jennifer F. Whetsell, Changing the Law, Changing the Culture:
Rethinking the "Sleepy Resident "Problem, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 23, 31-32 (2003)
(discussing how attending physicians are missing from most residency programs because
they train their second-year residents to supervise the first-years); Carolyne Krupa,
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there is not a tradition of senior physicians supervising non-staff physicians
even if they are relatively junior.
A. Organizational Implications
One potential implication of these considerations is that HCOs should be
organized so that their senior doctors have an equity ownership. Based on
conventional economic theory, this would encourage them to be more
efficient in order to increase the financial success of the HCO. These more
efficient standards of practice could then extend to junior physicians, at least
to the extent that they are subject to supervision by the senior physicians.
While this approach might sound promising, at this stage in the history of
the organization of medical care in the United States, it is not plausible to
recapitalize ownership in HCOs to make physicians equity owners.63
Moreover, most hospitals and IDNs are non-profit, non-stock corporations,
and no one, including physicians, can "make a profit" based on the financial
64
success of the HCO. Finally, physician ownership of hospitals can
implicate federal laws, such as the Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law
prohibitions.65 Consequently, financial incentives to physicians, if they are
necessary to promote alignment, must be structured in some way other than
Resident Work Hours, Supervision Face New Round of Restrictions, AMEDNEWS.COM
(July 5, 2010), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/07/05/pr110705.htm (discussing
how the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Educate proposed changes to
increase supervision of resident physicians, but only first-year students would have direct
supervision at all times).
63. See generally SARAH GUNTHER LANE, ET AL., A COMMUNITY LEADER'S GUIDE TO
HOSPITAL FINANCE: EvALUATING HOW A HOSPITAL GETS AND SPENDS ITS MONEY 2
(2001), http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/HospitalFinance.pdf
64. Id. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Various state laws regarding non-profit
organizations generally prohibit making distributions and thus would prevent
shareholders from owning equity in an HCO. Id.
65. The Stark Law prohibitions limit physician referrals for Medicare-covered
services to entities with which the physician has a financial relationship. See 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn (2006). The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits persons from offering or paying
providers, and providers from soliciting or receiving, something of value to induce a
referral or order of goods or services covered by Medicare or Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(b). See also Thompson, supra note 30, at 341-44.
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equity ownership. 66 Below, I discuss three approaches: Gainsharing, Pay for
Performance, and Accountable Care Organizations.67
Before I turn to the problem of structuring financial incentives to
physicians, it is worth noting that the equity ownership of partners may not
guarantee alignment with the goals of their firm. It is common for senior
attorneys to act in ways that benefit their own financial interests rather than
their firm's interests. Few firms of significant size determine
compensation based on a simple formula of dividing all the firm's profits
equally among partners.69 While this approach would tie compensation for
each partner directly to the success of the firm, it would also undermine the
incentive for any partner to work longer hours, bring in more business, etc.
Each partner may have an incentive to take a free ride on the efforts of the
other partners. Consequently, firms typically compensate partners based on
formulas that take into account the overall profitability of the firm, but also
consider the hours billed by the partner, the client work that is attributable to
the partner from bringing in new clients, the success of the partner in
particular matters, and so on.70
While this more complex approach to partner compensation is
understandable for purposes of creating incentives, it also means that a law
66. One interesting possibility is for non-profit hospitals to sell bonds to members of
the hospital's staff as well as other investors. The interest paid to bondholders would
depend on the financial performance of the HCO or one of the entities in its network.
Thompson, supra note 30, at 334-35. This approach might preserve the non-profit status
of the hospital, but it still assumes that the financial success of the HCO is sufficiently
linked to physician compensation to affect behavior. That will not necessarily be the
case.
67. See infra Part IV.C-E.
68. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, REGULATING THE EVOLVING LAW FIRM 2, 5 (2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/regulation/lawfirm.pdf
("Lawyers face a tradeoff between developing their own clientele and building the firm's
value. In order to remain viable business entities, law firms must align lawyers'
incentives with their firms' interests.").
69. Id.
70. See Joel A. Rose, How to Compensate Law Firm Managers, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (May 17, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?
id=1202494167945# (discussing various compensation formulas and noting that "[t]he
ultimate goal of a compensation system is to have the amount of money a partner takes
off the table bear a relationship to what the partner contributes.").
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firm partner might pursue his or her own financial interest at the expense of
the firm. For example, a partner might accept a client that creates a conflict
with matters that other attorneys might take on.71 The result might be that
overall profits of the firm go down, but the individual partner benefits.
Similarly, a partner might try to monopolize the time of skilled associates,
increasing his own billings but reducing billings for the firm overall. There
are many other examples, but the point is obvious: partners can act in their
own interest, rather than the interest of the firm. For these reasons, firms
spend considerable time and effort developing compensation formulas that
attempt to maximize the profitability of the firm while satisfying their
partners, particularly those who generate the most revenue for the firm.72
There is no simple solution, as firm managers will concede.73
B. Insurance and the Problem of Overutilization
Another difference between lawyers and doctors has to do with the
problem of overutilization. Both law firms and HCOs have traditionally
been compensated on a fee-for-service basis.74 Consequently, both types of
organizations have an incentive to provide more services because more
services mean more revenue. The result can be overutilization and increased
71. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2010).
72. See Elizabeth Chambliss, New Sources of Managerial Authority in Large Law
Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 63, 64 (2009) ("a position of managerial authority in the
firm, whether it be membership on the governing committee, a position at the head of a
department, or managing partner, will always be subordinate to the power of the lawyers
controlling the largest block of clients.").
73. See Rose, supra note 70; see also Ed Poll, Hang Together or be Hung
Separately: The Collective Compensation Dynamic, LAW.COM (Feb. 08, 2008),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005560068# (discussing incentive problems
created by individual compensation formulas, proposing, instead, a collective
compensation formula to increase firm profits); Joel A. Rose, Dealing with Tensions
Surround Partner Compensation, N.Y. STATE BAR (June 22, 2009),
http://nysbar.com/blogs/Tipoftheweek/2009/06/dealing with tensions surround.html
(opining that there is no ultimate partner compensation formula, and explaining the
factors that must be considered).
74. See Glossary, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/insure/
glossary/index.asp#f (last visited Oct. 29, 2010) (defining fee-for-service and detailing
that providers receive fees for office visits, tests, procedures, and other health care
services). See also Cleland Consulting Group Inc., A Seven-Step Process for Fixed-Fee
Billing, 35 L. PRAC. 50 (2009).
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costs.75 That is an extremely serious problem in health care, one of the most
difficult and ressing problems faced by Congress and the Obama
Administration. 6 Clients of law firms, even very large corporations,
routinely complain about the size of their legal bills, but there are no calls
for "bending the cost curve" of legal services. Why not?
We don't worry about overutilization of legal services for three reasons.
First, compared to health care, legal services constitute a very small
percentage of the gross domestic product, 1.5% in 2010, compared to 7.6%
for health care. Second, health care costs are generally covered by some
form of insurance, private or public.78 Increased costs covered by private
health insurance increase premiums for all policyholders. 79 Increased costs
for Medicare and Medicaid are paid by taxpayers.80 Costs for legal services
75. See Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal
for a More Functional System, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. POL'Y 1, 13-16 (2005-2006). See
also David M. Eddy, Balancing Cost and Quality in Fee-for-Services Versus Managed
Care, 16 HEALTH AFF. 16262-73 (1997).
76. See CMS Home, Research, Statistics, Data and Systems, National Health
Expenditure Data, NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHEFactSheet.asp (last visited
Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter CMS NHE Fact Sheet] (showing that health expenditures
increased to $2.5 trillion in 2009, and is expected to increase by an average of 6.1% per
year from 2009 to 2019). DHHS NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that a
comparable study found that the costs of health care are "far higher in the United States"
compared to the costs in its five largest trading partners).
77. Interactive Data, GDP-by-industry & Input-Output, Value Added by Industry as
a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF




78. Frank Newport & Elizabeth Mendes, About One in Six U.S. Adults Are Without
Health Insurance, GALLUP WELLBEING (July 22, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
121820/one-six-adults-without-health-insurance.aspx.
79. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2602(c)(7), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and 42 U.S.C.) (the preamble
to the law lists among its "Goals," "Eliminating Cost-shifting").
80. See CMSNHE Fact Sheet, supra note 76 (providing that $876.2 billion was spent
on Medicare and Medicaid services in 2009).
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are paid by individual clients. Third, as discussed below, law firm clients
have much more effective tools for controlling overutilization of legal
services than patients have to control overutilization of health care services.
Clients have several ways to control the costs of legal services. They can
try to mitigate the effects of the fee-for-service system by arranging for a
fixed retainer, for example, a flat monthly fee for an identified scope of
82work. In those cases, the lawyers' incentive is to meet the needs of the
client with the minimum number of hours possible.83 Second, at least when
clients are senior executives or lawyers themselves, they have more
confidence that they know what services are "really needed" than patients.
Consequently, it is far more common for clients to complain about legal bills
and to negotiate reductions than for patients to do the same thing.84 Third,
corporate clients have in-house counsel and if law firms become too
81. There are limited exceptions. First, the Government spends about $400 million
on legal services for low income persons. See Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1341, 125 Stat. 38, 123 (2011)
(appropriating $405 million to the Legal Services Corporation). See generally About
LSC, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/sc.php (last visited May 15, 2012).
These programs have never been adequately funded, and much of the legal services
provided to low income clients is provided pro bono. Second, there is a market for
insurance for legal services, but it is small compared to the overall market. If we ever
lose our senses and create an entitlement for legal services, we can be sure that there soon
will be a "crisis" in the cost of legal services.
82. See Larry Bodine, New Research on Law Firms Fees and Profitability,
LAWMARKETING CHANNEL (June 30, 2008), http://www.lawmarketing.com/pages/
articles.asp?Action=Article&ArticleCategorylD=58&ArticlelD=783 (finding that 88% of
firms use a going rates strategy, 83% of firms use an hourly or daily fees strategy, 87% of
firms use a fixed fee strategy, and 8% of firms use a value-based pricing strategy).
83. Cf id.
84. See Newsroom, Fact Sheets, Consumer Assistance Program Grants: How States
Are Using New Resource to Give Consumers Greater Control of their Health Care,
HEALTHCARE.GOV (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2010/10/
capgrants-states.html (listing dispute resolutions as one of the purposes towards which
states and communities will use their new Consumer Assistance Program grants, granted
to them under the ACA); see also Elisabeth Leamy, Save Big: Negotiate with Your
Doctor, ABC NEWS.COM (June 14, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/save-big-
negotiate-doctor/story?id=10888443#.Twh3uDW6bO4 (reporting that, although 61% of
people surveyed who negotiated with a doctor were successful in getting a lower fee,
only 12% of people surveyed ever tried negotiating).
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expensive, they can shift some of the work to them. Finally, clients can fire
the law firm and go somewhere else if they feel they are overcharged.
None of these tools for controlling costs are as effective for patients.
Patients routinely defer to their physicians to tell them what services they
85
need. In theory, they could leave their doctor or HCO and go somewhere
else if the costs are too high, but often they do not really know the full costs
until the end of an episode and they may feel committed to their provider no
matter what the cost. They do not have the equivalent option of shifting
work to in-house lawyers, although they can use home remedies or try to do
without needed care. 87  Finally, and most importantly, private or public
insurance pays most health care costs.88 Consequently, patients have less
incentive to control costs for their own medical episodes, even if they have
the tools to do so.
The closest equivalents to law firm clients in having tools to control health
care costs are the third party payers themselves. Both private payers and
public payers like CMS continue to engage in extensive efforts to control
costs,89 but the problem is vastly more difficult than in the case of legal
85. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights
and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 47, 54-55 (1994) ("[N]o matter what degree of autonomy a patient may want
. . . the patient is dependent on the physician's disclosure of diagnosis, prognosis,
treatment options, side effects, effectiveness, outcomes, etc.").
86. See Ha T. Tu & Johanna Lauer, Word of Mouth and Physician Referrals Still
Drive Health Care Provider Choice, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYs. CHANGE (Dec.
2008), http://hschange.org/CONTENT/1028/ (reporting that in 2007 only 11% of adults
were looking for a new primary care physician).
87. See Disparities/Minority Health: Americans, Especially Blacks, Spend
Substantial Periods of Time Uninsured, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND
QUALITY (Jul. 2011), http://www.ahrq.gov/research/jull1/071IRA3.htm; see also, Health
Coverage & Uninsured, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://statehealthfacts.org/comparecat.
jsp?cat=3&rgn=6&rgn=l (last visited May 15, 2012) (reporting that about 16% of the
U.S. population is uninsured).
88. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 76 (finding that private
health insurance spending was $801.2 billion, and government health expenditures were
$675 billion in 2009).
89. An extensive effort to do so is reflected in the ACA's creation of the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), a new subdivision of CMS dedicated to
studying new means of controlling costs. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
INNOVATION, http://innovations.cms.gov/ (last visited May 3, 2012); see also ACA, Pub.
2012 243
244 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVIII:2
services. For many years, the American health care system was dominated
by public and private payers, e.g., the Blues and Medicare, paying relatively
segregated providers on a fee-for-service basis.9 0  The disastrous
inefficiency of this system is well known. 91 A few decades ago, the
revolutionary change in health care delivery was assumed to be an
integration of payers and providers in a Health Maintenance Organization
("HMO"), with capitation payments from consumers or a public payer, such
as Medicare. 92 The hope was that combining the insurance and provider
functions would create incentives for the HMO to deliver high quality care
efficiently and to allocate more resources to preventive care. 93  This
approach would be accompanied by a high degree of integration among
hospitals and primary care and specialty physicians.94 HMOs did not prove
to be the solution many anticipated for a number of reasons, including the
desire for patients to choose their own physician and the financial risks of
this business model.95  While this model has lost much of its appeal, it
L. No. 111-148, § 3021, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of the Internal Revenue Code and 42 U.S.C.).
90. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Impact of the Medicare Modernization Act's Contracts
Reform on Fee-for-Service Medicare, 1 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 67 (2007).
91. Michael Ramlet & Carey Lafferty, Moving Beyond Fee-for-Service: The Case for
Managed Care in Medicaid, AM. ACTION FORUM (June 14, 2011) (arguing that the
decline of the Medicaid program "has been driven by an inefficient fee-for-service"). See
also ALAN M. GARBER & JONATHAN SKINNER, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, IS
AMERICAN HEALTHCARE UNIQUELY INEFFICIENT? (2008),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4257.pdf (discussing, among other inefficiencies in the
American health care system, the inefficiencies related to fee-for-service program).
92. Karen Visocan, Recent Changes in Medicare Managed Care: A Step Backwards
for Consumers, 6 ELDER L. J. 31, 38 (giving the history of HMOs).
93. See id. See also ROBERT KANE, ET AL., MANAGED CARE: HANDBOOK FOR THE
AGING NETWORK, Ch. 2 (1996).
94. See HMOs, ILL. DEP'T OF INS., http://insurance.illinois.gov/
healthinsurance/HMOs.asp (last visited May 15, 2012).
95. See Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible
Partnerships Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 132, 135 ("During
the 1980s and 1990s, hundreds of hospitals and hospital-physician organizations tried to
contract with insurers on the basis of capitation or to create their own health plans. Most
of these efforts had inadequate resources and weak governance, lacked the clinical
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would be too strong to say it "failed." Successful examples, such as Kaiser
Permanente and Geisinger Health System, are still in business.96
The most recent efforts to control costs take different approaches to
compensation of providers, and many of these approaches depend on
creating incentives to physicians to be more efficient. Some research shows
that financial incentives have the greatest potential to influence physician
behavior and promote alignment.97 However, it is much more difficult to
design incentives to promote physician alignment than to promote lawyer
alignment. In the case of lawyers, the goal is relatively easy to state:
increasing the profitability of the firm, while meeting professional and
ethical standards." Finding the best way to structure compensation can be
discipline and technology capacity to control the use of services or contain services, and
failed completely.").
96. KAISER PERMANENTE, ANNUAL REPORT (2010), http://xnet.kp.org/
newscenter/annualreport/docs/kpreport_20 10.pdf (reporting a $1.2 billion operating net
income for 2010, as well as leading the nation with Top National Committee Quality
Assurance Quality Compass marks in 23 quality measures); see also, GEISINGER HEALTH
SYSTEM, SYSTEM REPORT 4 (2010), http://www.geisinger.org/about/ar 2010_2.pdf
("Richard J. Umbdenstock, president of the American Hospital Association adds a
national perspective. 'Geisinger Health System is particularly well positioned to be a
national leader in creating the healthcare delivery system of the future. They have
steadily built the components and culture that is the backbone of accountable care that we
all hope will result in the highest quality, safest, and most efficient care for every patient
served."').
97. See, e.g, Peter P. Budetti, et al., Physician and Health System Integration, 21
HEALTH AFF. 202, 206 (2002); see also Bonnie Darves, Physician Compensation Models.
Big Changes Ahead, NEJM CAREER CTR. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.nejmjobs.org/physician-compensation-models-big-changes-ahead.aspx
(reporting that the trend toward devising bonus structures has gained "even more impetus
in the past two years" as hospitals move toward tighter alignment); GAIL HEAGAN & IVAN
WOOD, PHYSICIAN ALIGNMENT STRATEGIES 9 (2006),
http://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Programs/SpeakerResources/Documents/heaganwo
od2.pdf (maintaining that paying physicians each time they follow a protocol would have
the greatest likelihood for changing physician performance); Margaret D. Tocknell,
Healthcare Reform Pits Physicians Against Hospitals, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (Apr. 21,
2011), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-2/PHY-265202/Healthcare-Reform-
Pits-Physicians-Against-Hospitals (reporting that physicians said that half of their
compensation should be fixed salary, while the other half should be based on meeting
"productivity, quality, patient satisfaction, and cost-of-care goals, with upside earning
potential for perfornance.").
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challenging, as discussed above, but the need for incentives to increase
billings and bring in new clients is relatively straightforward.
Designing financial incentives for physicians is considerably more
complicated because the goal is often to encourage physicians to reduce
services-not increase them-while maintaining high quality of care.
Three prominent recent efforts illustrate the challenges: (1) Gainsharing; 99
(2) Pay for Performance;100 and (3) Accountable Care Organizations
("ACOs").101  Each approach has the potential to increase physician
alignment, but each has significant limitations.
C. Gainsharing
Gainsharing occurs when an HCO shares savings with its affiliated
physicians resulting from the physicians' adoption of more efficient
practices. In general, these savings are shared with a group of physicians,
not with individual physicians.102 Savings are based on a comparison with
an historical baseline. 0 3  For example, a recent study of cardiology
98. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 68 (discussing profits and ethical standards associated
with various law firm models).
99. See OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GAINSHARING
ARRANGEMENTS AND CMPS FOR HOSPITAL PAYMENTS TO PHYSICIANS TO REDUCE OR
LIMIT SERVICES TO BENEFICIARIES (1999) (defining gainsharing as "an arrangement in
which a hospital gives physicians a percentage share of any reduction in the hospital's
costs for patient care attributable in part to the physicians' efforts.").
100. See Quality & Patient Safety, Quality Information & Improvement, Pay for
Performance (P4P): AHRQ Resource, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND
QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/pay4per.htm (last updated Mar. 2012) (defining pay-
for-performance programs as "financial incentives that reward providers for the
achievement of a range of payer objectives, including delivery efficiencies, submission of
data and measures to payer, and improved quality and patient safety.").
101. ACOs are groups of providers of services and suppliers meeting criteria specified
by the Secretary may work together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-
service beneficiaries. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395 (2010)
(codified as amended at scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and 42 U.S.C.).
102. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS REPORT TO CONGRESS:
MEDICARE GAINSHARING DEMONSTRATION: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT AND SAVINGS 4 (2011), https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/
BuczkoGainSharingFinalReportMay_201 1.pdf [hereinafter CMS REPORT].
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gainsharing programs showed average savings of 7.4%, most of which came
from the use of lower cost devices.
An interesting example of a gainsharing program is described in a 2009
Advisory Opinion by the Office of Inspector General. 05 An HCO proposed
to share savings with three affiliated physician group practices offering
cardiology services. 06 The shared savings would be based on the adoption
of practices relating to cardiac catheterization, including standardizing the
types of devices and supplies they used.10 7 OIG agreed that the purpose of
the program was to reduce costs and encourage alignment:
Programs like [the proposal] are designed to align incentives by
offering physicians a portion of a hospital's cost savings in
exchange for implementing cost-saving strategies. Under the
current reimbursement system, the burden of these costs falls on
the hospitals, not physicians. Payments to physicians based on
cost savings may be intended to motivate them to reduce hospital
costs associated with procedures performed by physicians at
hospitals.108
Nevertheless, the OIG found that the proposed arrangement would likely
violate the Civil Monetary Penalties statute ("CMP"), which prohibits
hospitals from compensating physicians to reduce services to Medicare or
Medicaid patients. The OIG stated that it would not pursue sanctions
against the HCO if it proceeded with the arrangement because there were a
number of safeguards that minimized the risk that the arrangement would
103. See Ketcham & Furukawa, supra note 31, at 803. See also Williams Jackson,
Shared Accountability Approach to Physician Payment: Four Options for Developing
Accountable Care Organizations, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 185, 210 (2010) (noting that the
Medicare Advisory Committee emphasized "shared savings ... as driving re-aligned
incentives for efficiency.").
104. Ketcham & Furukawa, supra note 31, at 808.
105. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OIG ADVISORY OPINION No. 09-06
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 OIG OPINION].
106. Id.
107. See id. at 4.
108. Id. at 7.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
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harm patients.o1 0 The OIG also found that the arrangement might violate the
Anti-Kickback Statute because the program created incentives for the
physicians to admit Medicare and Medicaid patients to the HCO in order to
increase their compensation."' However, OIG said it would not seek
sanctions under that statute either because the specific arrangement
minimized the risks addressed by the statute." 2
D. Pay for Performance ("P4P")
Pay for Performance means that hospitals or physicians are paid a bonus if
they achieve certain positive health care outcomes for their patients.113 CMS
has funded a number of demonstration projects using this approach.1 For
example, CMS conducted a demonstration project in which it collected data
on 34 quality measures relating to five clinical conditions.! According to
CMS: "Hospitals scoring in the top 10% for a given set of quality measures
will receive a 2% bonus payment on top of the standard DRG payment for
the relevant discharges. Those scoring in the next highest 10% will receive
a 1% bonus."' 6 Note that the payments in this program were made to
hospitals, not physicians." In addition, there was no link with using
110. See 2009 OIG OPINION, supra note 105, at 9-10.
111. See id. at 12-13.
112. See id. The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits persons from offering or paying
providers, and providers from soliciting or receiving, something of value to induce a
referral or order of goods or services covered by Medicare or Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(b) (2006).
113. Pay for performance programs are incentive programs that provide monetary
bonuses or non-financial benefits to physician practices that make progress in achieving
or attaining specific quality and/or efficiency (cost of care) benchmarks or standards that
are established by the program. See Health Information Technology, Resources, Health
IT Glossary, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/health-information-technology/resources/glossary.page (last visited Jan. 7,
2012).
114. See Thompson, supra note 30, at 330.
115. Medicare "Pay for Performance (P4P) " Initiatives, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND
MEDICARE SERVS. (Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?
Counter-1343.
116. Id.
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particular devices that would reduce costs as in the gainsharing program.
Thus, this program did not raise questions under the CMP law discussed
above. To date, P4P programs have had mixed results. Despite rapid
growth and widespread adoption of P4P in the U.S. over the past five years,
the long-term benefits and results remain uncertain, and few U.S. programs
have implemented efficiency measures to demonstrate a significant financial
return-on-investment ("ROI").119
E. Accountable Care Organizations
The Affordable Care Act promotes the formation of ACOs by providing
for a unique form of Medicare reimbursement to HCOs called "shared
savings."' 0 These savings are based on the difference between the costs to
Medicare during a three-year period for the patients assigned to the ACO
and a comparable baseline.121 Like P4P programs (and unlike gainsharing),
the savings go to the HCOs rather than physicians.1 22 HCOs then decide
how to reward their physicians.123 Because this process still could violate
117. See id
118. See id.
119. One problem is that care is dispersed among multiple providers, making it
difficult to link positive outcomes with a particular physician. See Hoangmai H. Pham, et
al., Care Patterns in Medicare and Their Implications for Pay for Performance, 356 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1130 (2007). The authors studied Medicare claims for 1.79 million
beneficiaries. They found that beneficiaries saw a median of two primary care physicians
and five specialists working in four different practice areas. Id. at 1130. They concluded
that: "In fee-for-service Medicare, the dispersion of patients' cares among multiple
physicians will limit the effectiveness of pay-for-performance initiatives that rely on a
single retrospective method of assigning responsibility for patient care." Id. See also
Thompson, supra note 30, at 333 ("[F]or a number of reasons (a lack of aligned
incentives being one of the greatest), efforts to coordinate care around improve quality,
patient safety and efficiency have fallen short of their potential.").
120. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395 (2010) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and 42 U.S.C.).
121. § 3022, 124 Stat. at 398.
122. Id.
123. See id ("[I]f an ACO meets the requirements . .. a percent .. . of the difference .
. may be paid to the ACO as shared savings . . . ."). See also Medicare Program,
Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
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the CMP statute, CMS provided a waiver procedure in which HCOs could
apply for a waiver from the CMP statute, the Anti-Kickback Statute, and
other laws. 12 4 The reaction to the CMS's proposed regulations for the ACO
program was overwhelmingly negative.12 In general, commentators said
the burden and costs of the program outweighed its potential financial
incentives.126 CMS has now issued its final rule, which responds to many of
the criticisms it received in response to the proposed rule. The final rule
makes a number of important changes, but it remains to be seen whether the
revised program will interest a significant number of participants.128
V. CATEGORIES OF DECISIONS
I want to suggest that the challenge of alignment, either in an HCO or a
law firm, is related to whether a decision falls into one of three categories:
(1) decisions involving established knowledge in the profession; (2)
67,802, 67,814 (Nov. 11, 2011) (effective Jan. 3, 2012) ("Operationally, an ACO's legal
structure must provide both the basis for its shared governance as well as the mechanism
for it to receive and distribute shared savings payments to ACO participants and
providers/suppliers.").
124. CMS also published rules for ACOs to apply for waivers from certain federal
laws in order to operate effectively. Waiver Designs in Connection with the Medicare
Shared Savings Program and the Innovation Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,655 (proposed Apr. 19,
2011).
125. See Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,804-972.
126. See, e.g., Comments of the Cleveland Clinic, Letter from Delos M. Cosgrove,
M.D., to Donald Berwick, M.D. 5 (May 26, 2011) (on file with author). Comments of
the American Hospital Association, Letter from Rick Pollack to Donald M. Berwick,
M.D. 15 (June 1, 2011) (on file with author). Comments of the American Medical
Association, Letter from Michael D. Maves, M.D., to Donald Berwick, M.D. 12 (June 3,
2011) (on file with author). Comments of America's Health Insurance Plans, Letter from
Carmello Bocchino and Joni Hong to Donald Berwick, M.D. 7-8 (June 6, 2011) (on file
with author).
127. See Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,804-67,972.
128. See Edward Correia, Afterword: The FinalACO Rule, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 260 (2012).
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discretionary professional judgments; and (3) decisions about administrative
support and infrastructure. By these categories I mean the following:
(1) Established knowledge means facts and principles that are widely
recognized in the profession and not subject to reasonable dispute. For
example, in the legal profession, there is a body of established statutory,
constitutional, and court-made law. These principles are often complex and
hard to understand (that is why only highly educated professionals apply
them), but experts would fundamentally agree about them. Similarly, there
are rules of procedure that have the force of law in both federal and state
courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a complaint filed
in federal court must be answered within a certain time, or some other
response must be filed, such as a motion to dismiss. 129 The Federal Rules of
Evidence provide for the admissibility of certain types of evidence and the
exclusion of other types. 13 0 There are judgment calls that must be made
within the constraints of these rules, but the basic principles are well
understood and must be followed if the lawyer is to avoid sanctions, adverse
outcomes, or malpractice suits. In medicine, thousands of principles of
medical science are well-established: a lack of oxygen to the heart will cause
cardiac failure, liver failure will lead to death if not reversed, and so on.
Similarly, standards of medical practice include the circumstances when
general anesthesia can be used, the essential laboratory tests for patients who
present certain symptoms, and so forth.131 These treatment standards can be
identified in treatment protocols or statements by medical authorities. 132In
129. FED. R. Clv. P. 12
130. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401-15.
131. See, e.g., Julie A. Muroff, Policing Willpower: Obesity as a Test Case for State
Empowerment of Integrated Health Care, 11 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 71-72
(2011) (discussing integrated treatment protocols and how studying them can help better
serve public health and individual needs); see also Louise G. Trubek, New Governance
and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 139, 151 (2006) (arguing
how increased information exchange "allows traditional public health to be merged with
health care delivery; a physician with ten diabetic patients using the same treatment
protocols can obtain information about diabetes treatments, and share all this internally,
as well as with other institutions."); David R. Johnson, Mandatory HIV Testing Issues in
State Newborn Screening Programs, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 55, 62 (1992) (explaining how
treatment protocols for HIV infections were gaining acceptance in the medical
community).
132. See Muroff, supra note 131, at 71-72 (discussing integrated treatment protocols
and how studying them can help better serve public health and individual needs); see also
Trubek, supra note 131, at 151 (arguing how increased information exchange "allows
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addition, these treatment standards are cited in medical malpractice cases by
experts.' 33
It is reasonable for a law firm or an HCO to insist that professionals
associated with their organization comply with these principles. If they do
not, the professionals, as well as the organizations with which they are
affiliated, are subject to severe sanctions such as malpractice liability and
license revocation.134 Although it would likely be viewed as intrusive and
unnecessary, a law firm or HCO could reduce these basic principles to a
written compliance manual.
(2) Discretionary judgments include decisions where there are no clearly
established principles for guidance. Instead, senior lawyers must use their
discretion in a particular case. In the legal profession, for example, broad
legal principles established by the Supreme Court may be reasonably clear,
but how they apply in a new set of circumstances is not. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (and the Constitution) are clear in providing a right to a
jury trial, but it is not clear when it is in the interest of a party to demand a
jury.135 A defendant has a right to testify in a criminal case, 36 but when it
traditional public health to be merged with health care delivery; a physician with ten
diabetic patients using the same treatment protocols can obtain information about
diabetes treatments, and share all this internally, as well as with other institutions.");
Johnson, supra note 131, at 62 (explaining how treatment protocols for HIV infections
were gaining acceptance in the medical community).
133. See Horsley v. Richland Corr. Inst., No. 2004-03454, 2005 WL 1020918, at *1,
*2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Apr. 18, 2005) (finding that the "defendant established a protocol for the
treatment of chronic Hepatitis C and that plaintiff admitted that the protocol was followed
with regard to his care."). See also Lewis v. Tulane Univ. Hosp. & Clinic, 855 So. 2d
383, 385 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the finding that all aspects of a treatment
protocol during hospitalization were in compliance with the appropriate standard of care
by the defendant-physician); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice
Litigation and Tort Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1133
(2006) (arguing that physicians who adhere to standards and treatment protocols should
be immune from malpractice suits).
134. See, e.g., State Law Summaries: Medical Malpractice and Reform, FINDLAW,
http://injury.findlaw.com/medical-malpractice/state-medical-malpractice-and-
reform.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (listing each state's malpractice process and
procedures).
135. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 38-39.
136. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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makes sense for defense counsel to put a defendant on the stand is a complex
strategic decision that requires a number of considerations, including
whether the defendant can be impeached, whether calling the defendant
might breach ethical considerations, and so on.'
Similarly, in the medical profession, when a patient is experiencing
significantly impaired blood flow through the cardiac arteries, the physician
must do something. 138 But which therapeutic approach makes sense-using
only drugs, inserting a stent, performing cardiac bypass surgery, etc.-may
not be clear at all.'3  Women who have cancerous cells in their uterus have
a high risk for more widespread cancer in their uterus, ovaries, and other
organs. Consequently, there must be some medical intervention, but the best
approach-removing the uterus, removing the ovaries, using chemotherapy,
or a combination of these procedures-is a complex decision that requires
expert analysis of the particular case.140 Decisions in this category, in both
professions, are not made by administrators or managers, 141 instead, the
senior lawyers or doctors who are dealing with the particular case have to
make them.
(3) Finally, decisions about administrative support and infrastructure
include decisions about how the organization functions and what purchases
it makes to support its professionals. For law firms, that means decisions
about purchasing everything from telephone systems to computers;
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmts. (2010).
138. See AMA Code of Ethics: Principle of Medical Ethics, AM. MED. Ass'N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/principles-medical-ethics.page? (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
139. See Kevin B. O'Reilly, Physician-Ethicist Explains "Ashley Treatment"
Decision, AMDEDNEWS.COM (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2007/03/12/prse0312.htm. See also Susan J. Landers, Lyme Disease Debate Provokes
Treatment Divide, Legal Action, AMEDNEWS.COM (Dec. 25, 2006), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2006/12/25/hlsal225.htm.
140. Ovarian Cancer, Treatment, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/ovarian-
cancer/treatment.html (last visited May 3, 2012) (listing treatment options for ovarian
cancer).
141. There are some exceptions. Junior physicians, e.g., junior residents, are
supervised by more senior physicians. Sometimes, an administrator or a committee may
overrule the decision of the attending doctor, even a senior physician, after an extensive
review of the facts. However, the overwhelming majority of decisions are made by the
attending physician and other specialists he or she consults.
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developing rules about hours and compensation; decisions about hiring
junior attorneys and non-legal staff; and devising policies for paying for
travel.142 For HCOs, this process includes decisions about purchasing
supplies and equipment, hiring and firing hospital staff, building new
facilities, making administrative and financial decisions, etc. Within law
firms, by and large, these kinds of decisions are made by administrators
based on broad policies approved by the law firm partners.143 While the
partners may serve on a committee dealing with a major purchase,
administrators are usually responsible for making these kinds of decisions in
particular cases. Individual partners can make a request, but they typically
have little or no say in a particular purchasing decision. This is so because
administrators have the expertise to make such decisions without relying on
the professional judgment of the lawyers, and involving lawyers in
individual decisions would take time away from the practice of law. It is
true that sometimes individual law partners have a strong preference for a
particular decision, and it may be uncomfortable for the administrators to
stand up to senior partners. However, the general assumption is that it is in
the interest of the firm for administrators to make decisions in individual
144cases.
Below I suggest how dividing decisions into these categories can be
useful in thinking about solutions to the problem of physician alignment.
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF ALIGNMENT
What lessons can we learn from our comparison of lawyers and
physicians and our discussion of structuring financial incentives to
physicians? I want to suggest four lessons learned:
(1) Repeal or narrow the Civil Monetary Penalties law. Law firms can
reward partners who increase the firm's profits, whether they do it by
bringing in more revenue, reducing costs, or both. The OIG opinion
discussed above shows how the Civil Monetary Penalties law can prevent
HCOs from rewarding physicians who reduce costs, and how the Anti-
Kickback Statute can prevent HCOs from rewarding physicians who
increase revenues.145 Moreover, according to 01G, "whether the current
142. Carroll, supra note 57.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. For example, the OIG Opinion discussed above concluded that all of the
recommendations included in the requestor's letter implicated the CMP: "Simply put,
with respect to the recommendations under the Arrangement regarding standardization of
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medical practice reflects necessity or prudence is irrelevant for purposes of
the CMP."' 46 The barriers caused by the Civil Monetary Penalties law in
HCO efforts to reduce costs led CMS to include a waiver procedure in the
ACO regulations. 147 While OIG has written a number of advisory opinions
allowing gainsharing programs to proceed, HCOs should not have to live
with the uncertainty of the statute and the burden of having to seek an
advisory opinion in every case. Congress should consider repealing or
narrowing the CMP and the OIG should consider interpreting the Anti-
Kickback Statute so that it does not prevent constructive financial incentives
for physicians. 14 8
(2) Increase the level offinancial incentives. Law firms provide very
substantial financial incentives to their attorneys. Bonuses for associates are
routinely in the tens of thousands of dollars and very successful partners
receive hundreds of thousands of dollars (or more) for making the firm more
profitable.149 While financial incentives can influence physician behavior,
structuring those incentives is a complex task.150  The magnitude of
incentives for physicians is not likely to equal those for very successful
partners, but, assuming financial incentives can be appropriately targeted,
they must be significant.' 5' The lack of meaningful financial incentives is
clearly a weakness in CMS's proposed regulations for ACOs.
devices and supplies, the Arrangement might induce physicians to reduce or limit the
then-current medical practices at the Hospital." 2009 OIG OPINION, supra note 105, at 9.
146. Id.
147. Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,840 (Nov. 11, 2011) (effective Jan. 3, 2012).
148. For example, Congress could authorize a waiver procedure, administered by OJG
or some other agency, for all health care organizations, similar to the one proposed by
CMS for ACOs. Alternatively, Congress could review the experience in granting waivers
under the ACO program to develop safe harbors to include in both the CMP and the Anti-
kickback Statute.
149. See Law Firm Profits are Up, but Bonuses Don't Follow Suit, RUETERS (Dec. 8,
2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/12_-
December/Law firmprofits are up,_but bonuses don t followsuit/ (reporting that
2011 law firm bonuses ranged from $7,500 to $200,000).
150. See supra Part IV.C-E.
151. One gainsharing program reported payouts to physicians averaging $17,000,
ranging from $0 to $59,000. See Ketcham & Furukawa, supra note 31, at 804. The high
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CMS estimates the total net savings to the federal government in the first
three years of the ACO program to be $510 million based on the assumption
that there will be between 75 and 150 ACOs.152 Assuming ACOs are
rewarded with the same amount (it could be a little more), an average ACO
would be rewarded with about $4.5 million over three years, or $1.5 million
per year. Based on these figures, a reasonable estimate of the ultimate
savings to be shared with physicians is less than $100 per physician per
patient. The same problem may exist in pay for performance programs,
too. 154  The revised final rule mitigates this problem by increasing the
financial incentives to ACOs.155 It is unlikely that these modifications will
solve a fundamental problem: The dollar amounts available to individual
physicians are too small to change behavior significantly.
(3) Reduce physician discretion where there is reliable comparative
effectiveness data. In the categorization of decisions discussed above,
Category 2 decisions must be made by the treating physician or the lawyer
handling the case. However, if the HCO has reliable and specific
comparative effectiveness data clearly showing the desirability of a
particular treatment protocol, the same level of professional discretion is not
required. The decision then belongs in Category 1, and administrators can
insist that that a particular protocol should be followed.156 Moreover, if
other HCOs have the same data, the physician cannot credibly threaten to
move to another HCO in order to achieve a different outcome.
end of this range is presumably significant in influencing behavior, and perhaps the
average level is, too, but that seems less certain.
152. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations (Proposed
Rule), 76 Fed. Reg. 19,528, 19,638-39.
153. For example, an ACO with 10,000 beneficiaries would get $150 per patient.
Assume that the ACO decides to allocate 50% of this amount to physicians and three
physicians qualify for a reward for an average patient. Each physician would receive $25
per patient. See Edward W. Correia, Accountable Care Organizations: The Proposed
Regulations and Prospects for Success, 17 AM. J.OF MANAGED CARE 560, 568 (2011).
154. GEOFFREY BAKER, PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN
HEALTHCARE: MARKET DYNAMICS AND BUSINESS PROCESS 6 (2003),
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog-Pay forPerformanceBriefing.pdf.
155. See Correia, supra note 128.
156. See CDC GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION, supra note 32 (providing a possible
example of a treatment protocol involving use of urinary catheters).
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Comparative effectiveness data will not be available for all medical
conditions or for all patients. Many situations will present unique
circumstances or the comparative effectiveness data will be ambiguous. In
addition, even if the data seem to suggest one approach, there may be an
alternative that is only slightly inferior. The HCO may not feel it is worth
insisting on one approach when the potential savings in resources or the
likely differences in outcomes are slight. However, when the data are clear
and the stakes are significant, the HCO is in a strong position to require that
a particular protocol should be followed.
The problem with this solution, of course, is that the American health care
system is only just now taking seriously the need for comparative
effectiveness data. It may be many years before an HCO can insist on
treatment protocols for a large number of medical decisions. Congress and
CMS should place even more emphasis on the collection and analysis of this
kind of information.
(4) Reduce physician involvement in purchasing decisions. In general,
individual lawyers do not make administrative decisions, Category 3 above.
However, there continues to be a tradition within HCOs for individual
physicians to be extensively involved in these decisions, particularly with
regard to the purchase of "physician preference" items.' 5 7 Arguably, there is
more medical expertise required in deciding what capital equipment should
be purchased for the surgical suite than the level of legal expertise required
to purchase, for example, computers for the law firm. Nevertheless, it is
widely believed by HCO managers that physicians are too involved in
making these kinds of decisions at the expense of the HCO.158
Some large IDNs have developed decision-making procedures for
purchasing that reduce the role of the physician.159 Physicians may serve on
157. See Eleanor D. Kinney, For Profit Enterprise in Health Care: Can it Contribute
to Health Reform?, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 405, 433 (2010) (arguing that one of the reforms
needed to make health care more efficient is "a revision of the entrepreneurial spirit in
medicine that encourages some doctors to order unnecessary goods and services."). But
see id. (noting physicians' defense that they order goods and services out of fear of
medical malpractice).
158. See CMS REPORT, supra note 102, at 8 (claiming that gaining control of
hospitals' supply chains-the flow of products and associated services to meet the needs
of the hospital and its providers-is difficult because "the most expensive materials-up
to 60% of the total supply expenditures-are for items about which physicians have
strong preference." (citation omitted)).
159. See Mission Statement, JOHNS HOPKINs MED.,
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/purchasing/geninfo/mission.html (last visited May 3,
2012).
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advisory committees, but they do not have the final say, and they do not
have a veto over a particular decision. Not only can these procedures reduce
costs, for example, by enabling the HCO to limit the number of different
types of capital equipment it must buy, they can also reduce potential legal
problems that can arise if physicians are suspected of distorting their
decision-making because of a financial relationship with manufacturers.
Consider the gainsharing program involving cardiac catheterization
procedures discussed above. The HCO that wanted to implement this
program wanted to share savings with physician groups if they ordered
particular lower cost devices.160 If the HCO had data showing that these
devices work just as well or better, and they cost less, why shouldn't the
HCO be able to require all physicians using its facilities to order those
devices? After all, the HCO has to pay for them. Under that approach,
there is no need for shared savings and the CMP law should not be
implicated. 161
Physicians should be able to have some input in purchasing decisions
where there are complex medical or technical questions involved in the
decision. However, the days of unquestioned "physician preference items"
should end. The argument for reducing physician discretion about purchases
is even stronger than for expanding the use of treatment protocols discussed
above. Limiting the role of physicians in purchasing can have multiple
benefits. First, the HCO can reduce costs by choosing the most cost-
effective supplies and equipment. Second, minimizing physician
involvement reduces the risk that a manufacturer-physician relationship will
offend the Anti-Kickback Statute. As in the case of treatment protocols,
administrators are in a much stronger position to limit physician discretion if
they can point to reliable comparative effectiveness data.
VII. CONCLUSION
If the American health care system is ever to be reasonably "efficient," as
that word is understood in other industries, the decision-making of American
physicians must become more closely aligned with the goals of the
160. See 2009 OIG OPINION, supra note 105, at 4 ("To develop the Arrangement, the
Program Administrator conducted a study of the historical practices of the Groups with
respect to cardiac catheterization procedures performed at the Hospital and identified
twenty-one specific cost-savings opportunities.").
161. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2006) (imposing penalties on those who
knowingly and willfully: (1) offering or paying remuneration to induce the referral of
Federal health care program business; or (2) soliciting or receiving remuneration in return
for the referral of Federal health care program business).
2012 Law Firm Lessons for Healthcare Organizations 259
organizations with which they work. It seems clear that some changes in the
system can increase alignment: (1) providing more significant financial
incentives for physicians that are tied to efficient use of resources; (2)
developing the use of comparative effectiveness data to enable HCOs to
establish treatment protocols; (3) reducing the role of physicians in
purchasing decisions; and (4) amending or reinterpreting certain federal laws
that inhibit the development of programs to reward efficiency. The
American legal system, despite its excesses and waste, has within it a
number of structural incentives to keep costs down and encourage lawyers to
act more or less consistently with the goals of their law firms. We surely
don't want large health care organizations to resemble large law firms in all
respects, but there may be some lessons that the doctors can learn from the
lawyers.
